When prices don't steer Mimicking ambitious carbon pricing with energy performance standards

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Climate policy: policy interactions

Figure 1 • The core policy mix: a carbon price, energy efficiency and technology policies



Note: unless otherwise indicated, all material in figures and tables derives from IEA data and analysis.



Figure 6 • Policy interactions can significantly impact ETS prices



Background

- Demand side measures needed for **deep decarbonisation** (1.5 to 2°C target)
- The market for energy efficient appliances is characterized by various 'failures'
 Market, behavioral, organizational
- Among them is the external effect of electricity use on climate change
- Carbon pricing is a common instrument to internalize this climate externality
- But it does not cover much of the world CO₂ emissions and prices are low
 - » most carbon prices < 25 USD</p>
 - » WTP = 10 to 100+ USD
 - » social cost of carbon = 20 to 150 USD

It is easier to adopt stringent MEPS than to implement progressive pricing policies!

Minimum Energy Performance Standards (MEPS)



Purpose

- model the market price of appliances in a UK market and how life cycle costs (LCC) shift when the social cost of carbon (SCC) is factored in.
- examine how the inclusion of the SCC affects the point at which least life cycle costs (LLCC) for an appliance class are reached.
- discuss the implications for mixed policy design when climate change externalities are addressed primarily through MEPS, as well as the merits of such a policy approach.

The Data

	n =		A+++	A++	A+	A	В	С
Refrigerators	978	Number of models	37	317	624	0	0	0
		% sales in EU 2014	4%	21%	72%	2%	0%	0%
Dishwashers ¹	358	Number of models	54	89	184	31	0	0
		% sales in EU 2013	3%	23%	35%	38%	0%	0%
Tumble Dryers ²	148	Number of models	4	49	13	0	63	19
		% sales in EU 2014	2%	22%	16%	2%	34%	23%
Televisions ³	232	Number of models	0	11	103	99	19	0
		% sales in EU 2013	0%	1%	23%	45%	13%	3%

 $LCC = P \downarrow A + PWF * P \downarrow E * UEC$









		Minimum carbon price needed to trigger the shift (in GBP/ ton)							
Appliance	Shift from	EF=413;	EF=413;	EF=413;	EF=700;	EF=200;			
		P _E =0.14	P _E =0.10	P _E =0.20	P _E =0.14	P _E =0.14			
Refrigerators	A+ to A++	372	468	226	219	767			
	A+ to A+++	77	174	0	46	159			
Televisions	A to A+/A++/A+++	0	0	0	0	0			
	A+ to A++/A+++	0	0	0	0	0			
	A++ to A+++	0	0	0	0	0			
Tumble dryers (condenser, 8kg)	B to A+/A++/A+++	0	45 (to A+++)	0	0	0			
	A+ to A++	136	233	0	81	281			
	A+ to A+++	382	479	237	226	789			
Dish washers	A+ to A++	429	526	284	253	885			
(12 place settings)	A+ to A+++	862	959	717	509	1780			

EF= emissions factor (in gCO₂/kWh); PE = price of electricity (in GBP/kWh)

Country energy mix very important!

Main message: including the SCC in the LCC calculation implies a minor shift of the optimum unit energy consumption



Optimal UEC shifts if SCC included:

38.9 kWh/ year

3.9 kWh/ year

Key findings

- MEPS can internalize the climate externality as well as carbon pricing, BUT (!)
- Consumers do not act like rational market actors, so that MEPS in contrast to carbon pricing – warrant effectiveness
- Even without SCC, LLCC-thinking implies tighter MEPS for some appliances
- For other appliances including the SCC does not change the LLCC optimum or causes only marginal changes
- There are other (good) reasons to tighten caps, which over time have shown to be compatible with lower (!) prices and higher quality
- MEPS easier to implement than pricing, but recently some 'backlash'

Merci!!!

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